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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RULON R. WEST, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E. 
WEST, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants. 
Case No. 
10251 
RESPONDENTS' AND 
CROSS .. APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
---0---
For the convenience of the Court the texts of 
the agreements are annexed to this brief as 
appendices "A" for the Articles of Partnership 
"B" for the Dissolution Agreement and "C" for 
the Supplemental Agreement. The documents 
are referred to in the brief however by the Ex-
hibit numbers affixed at trial. 
---0---
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Respondents adopt Appellant's statement under this 
heading but enlarge it to correctly show this court directed 
the trial court to determine the intent of the parties when 
they executed all agreements: Articles of Partnership, 
(Ex. 1) Dissolution Agreement, (Exs. 2 and 15) and a 
Supplemental Agreement (Ex. 16) . 
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The chief question to be answered upon appeal is 
as it has always been, were the payments made by Rulo~ 
into the partnership made as loans or as contributions to 
Capital? 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents adopt Appellant's characterization of 
the disposition below. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the judgment 
except as to the following points raised on cross-appeal: 
1. The finding and judgment that the amounts paid 
into the partnership by Rulon after December 3, 1958, 
were not contributions to capital and should be repaid 
him prior to distribution on the 40, 40, and 20 per cent 
basis should be reversed as set forth in detail under 
Respondents' Argument VII herein. 
2. The finding and judgment that interest on a 
partner's capital account not paid in a given year should 
be credited to a liability account of the partnership, 
payable to the partner, and should not be credited to 
his capital account is not supported by the evidence, is 
offensive to generally accepted accounting practices and 
procedure, is erroneous as a matter of law, and should be 
reversed as set forth in detail under VIII in the argument 
herein. 
3. The court's finding and judgment that in the 
calculation of "gross profits" salaries to partners should 
not be deducted from gross sales or income is not sup-
ported by the evidence and is erroneous as a matter of 
law, and should be reversed as set forth in Argument IX 
herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While the \vriter conducted the trial of the case for 
11111111111111111111 
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respondent's before Judge Jeppson, it is his first appear-
ance in the case on appeal. 
The various statements of fact heretofore presented 
to the court by the parties in the two appeals are ex-
haustive and little would be served to chronicle them 
anew. However, the writer believes that to bring the case 
into proper perspective some fuller mention must be 
made of the events attendant upon the dissolution of the 
partnership in March 1960, because the acts of the parties 
at that time would be definitively determinative of their 
intent at all stages of their relationship. 
After approximately two and one half years of the 
running of the partnership Rulon caused his counsel to 
send Terry a letter on March 21 , 1960 (Ex. 8) notifying 
Terry of Rulon's withdrawal from the partnership and 
advising Terry this worked a dissolution under Utah 
statutes. 
The letter referred to paragraphs 12 and 6 of the 
Articles and stated that after the winding up the assets 
should be distributed, and 40 per cent was to be dis-
tributed to Rulon. 
In the ten days following the letter, Mr. Earl M. 
Wunderli, Rulon's then counsel, Mr. E. L. Schoenhals, 
Terry's and Flora's then counsel, and Terry and Rulon 
themselves had conversations looking to an orderly wind-
ing up of the business. These conversations eventuated in 
the draft by Wunderli of the Dissolution Agreement 
(Exs. 2 and 15). Rulon, Terry, Wunderli, and Schoenhals 
met in Murray, Utah, on or about April 2 to discuss the 
winding up and to execute the agreement. Flora was not 
present, it being the apparent intention of the others that 
her presence was not required. 
All parties seemed friendly and amiable at this 
juncture, although the dissolution itself had grown out of 
dissatisfaction with the results of the partnership venture. 
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All persons at the meeting knew the following: 
1. That Rulon had put approximately $150 000 
into the partnership. ' 
2. That the total value of the business was now 
something less than $150,000. 
3. That if Rulon had his entire contribution re-
turned to him, there would be nothing left to divide 40%, 
40%, and 20%. 
Earlier, and during the running of the partnership 
venture, Rulon had discussed estate planning with his 
attorneys Wunderli and Holdsworth in Terry's presence. 
(R. 141-142). At the meeting in Murray, additional 
discussion was had with respect to the tax consequence 
of Terry and Flora receiving the substantial interests they 
were to receive from the partnership upon dissolution. 
These considerations revolved around the possible income 
tax liability which Flora and Terry might bear as opposed 
to the more favorable treatment of the situation if the 
transfer of these interests were effected by gift from 
Rulon to Terry and Flora and the resulting lower tax 
burden of the gift tax rates. ( R. 334-342). Both counsel 
and the parties apparently agreed that the overall effect 
of the operation of the Articles of Partnership and the 
Dissolution Agreement was that a gift of some 60% of 
Rulon's contributions had been made to Terry and 
Flora. As a consequence of this, Exhibit 16, an agreement 
designated as supplemental to the Dissolution Agreement, 
was struck. This supplemental agreement was drawn 
under a time pressure, because Rulon was departing on 
a trip momentarily (R. 338) and because of the time 
pressure it undoubtedly lacks art. However, it expressed 
over Rulon's and Terry's signature that the amounts 
Terry and Flora were to receive were by way of gift, and 
Rulon, to implement this concept, agreed to forthwith 
execute and file gift tax returns. (Ex. 16) 
Summaries of relevant testimony and the contents 
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of the various exhibits will be set forth in more detail in 
connection with the arguments hereafter. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO 
THE INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES AS REP-
RESENTED IN THE ARTICLES OF PARTNER-
SHIP, THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT, AND 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT ARE FULLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
There are two classic concepts that bear on all points 
to be argued herein: 
FIRST: That the trial court having the parties 
before him in the flesh is in a better position than a 
reviewing court to evaluate credibility and determine 
ultimate fact, particularly to the extent that these evalua-
tions depend upon those subtle human actions and re-
actions which are present in the trial but are strangely 
missing from the printed record. Moreover, the trial, 
however long, is stamped in the judge's mind as a cohe-
sive unit rather than a disjointed series of subjects and 
events as it appears in the record and in briefs. Growing 
out of this venerable concept is the 
SECOND: that the reviewing court will not reverse 
the findings of the trial court in the presence of sub-
stantial evidence on which the trial court's findings are 
based. 
When this court remanded for the trial court to 
take evidence as to the intent of the parties when they 
executed the three agreements, it stated that in this con-
nection "it is proper to consider the background and 
circumstances, including the relationship of the parties, 
the purposes for which the documents were made, and 
principles of equity and justice relating thereto." 
Appellant assails the findings because, inter alia, the 
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court failed to find with respect to "actual intent." Intent 
is subjective. An objective trier of fact cannot, of course, 
look into a man's mind to determine intent. He infers 
from the person's words and acts what the intent is. 
Rulon is heard in court attempting to repudiate an 
intent once clearly expressed in conversations and in 
documents which he caused to be formulated. The court 
was obviously unimpressed with Rulon's current claim 
that his payments into the partnership were all loans, 
\vhen his words and acts, and particularly those reduced 
to writing, were eloquent of the intent to commit his 
contributions irrevocably to the fortunes of the partner-
ship, including the sharing of these contributions on a 
40-40-20 per cent basis with his son and wife upon dis-
solution. 
Taking the findings one by one, the evidence re-
garding intent reveals the following: 
FINDING NO. 2 (R. 65) 
The finding is that the intent of all the parties was 
that the $47,500 equity in the real estate contract to-
gether with $1,000 in a bank account were capital con-
tributions by Rulon and did not constitute a loan to the 
partnership. This intent was expressed at paragraph 3(a) 
of the Articles. (Emphasis added) 
Paragraph 3 (a) states in unambiguous wording that 
"the capital of the partnership shall consist of the fol-
lowing property:" (a) designates the $48,500, and (b) 
" .. A.ny further sums which any partner shall with the con-
sent of the others from time to time contribute for capital 
purposes "'rhich shall be credited to his capital account." 
It is undisputed that Rulon contributed an addi-
tional $100,000, that it was consented to by Flora and 
Terry, that it was used for capital purposes and, until 
dissolution, was credited to Rulon's capital account. 
In connection with intent at the inception of the 
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partnership the witnesses testified regarding the original 
$48,500 and the subsequent monies to be committed to 
the venture as follows : 
Mr. Roberts, the scrivener, said he had handled the 
real estate contract, that Rulon asked him to designate 
the buyers thereunder as Rulon and Terry. Roberts asked 
if Rulon wanted a designation of himself and Terry as 
tenants in common or joint tenants, and Rulon replied 
"It doesn't make much difference, because we are going 
to turn it over to a partnership immediately." The same 
day, Rulon asked Roberts to prepare an assignment of 
the Mortensen contract to a partnership known as "El 
Rancho Enterprises." (R. 92-93) 
Rulon did not then designate his contributions as 
loans rather than capital, his chief concern being receiv-
ing interest on the money. He testified : 
Q: So, in fact you and Terry agreed that interest 
was to be paid on the capital accounts, did you not? 
A: If you wish to call it capital. I don't know 
where you can put it. I am not a bookkeeper. I am not 
an accountant. All I knew (know) is that I had $150,000, 
approximately, in there, and I was expecting to get 5% 
interest on my money, whether you name it "capital" or 
whether you name it something else." (R. 163) 
When asked why he didn't insist that Roberts iden-
tify his contributions as "loans" he stated he was expect-
ing fairness from Terry and when challenged on this 
he replied: 
Q: Do you here today assert Terry West got 
Paul Roberts to change the wording from what you 
wanted it to be? 
(Objection entered) 
A: No, I'm not alluding (to) that in any way. 
Q: You didn't, in any case, insist that Paul Roberts 
write the word "loan" in there, did you? 
A: No, I didn't. (R. 164) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
The word "loan" doesn't appear in the Articles in 
connection with partners' contributions. 
Moreover, when Mr. Roe was attempting to lead 
Rulon into a statement that he discussed the return of 
his money with Terry, he would not be so led: 
Q: (Roe) : What I'm trying to find out, Mr. 
West, whether, at any time during the advances you and 
Terry talked about the method these sums would be 
repaid, or whether they would be treated as capital, or 
loans, or anything of that kind, that is what (I'm) trying 
to find out . . . Was there any discussion of that sort. 
A. : No, there was no discussions. * * * 
Q: There was no discussion? 
A. : No discussion. ( R. 154-S) 
* * * 
Q.: . . . At that time now subsequent to that 
occasion, were there any discussions between you and 
him about that? You understand ~Nhat I mean by "about 
that"? 
A.: No, I think . . . 
Q.: By "about that" I mean whether the sums 
you paid over were to be paid back, or whether they 
were to be put into capital, or what was to be done 
with them? 
A.: A few months later, yes. 
Q.: Where did this conversation occur, and when, 
and who was present, if you remember? 
A. : Again, it was out at the motel; and, again, 
we were alone, and I told him that I had to have some 
interest returned to me on my money. 
He told me, as soon as he got the trailer court built 
and had it rented, that I would receive 5 per cent on 
my money. (R. 155) (Emphasis added) 
FLORA was deposed by l\1r. Roe on April14, 1961, 
just three months after the lawsuit was filed. He soug~t 
therein by leading questions her admission that she dtd 
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not intend, originally, to get an interest in Rulon's con-
tributions. Her responses are clearly to the contrary: 
Q.: Was it your thought, then, that if you received 
some share of the corporation (partnership) that it dated 
from that gift you are talking about? 
A.: From the beginning ... from the beginning 
... from the beginning of the partnership. (R. 179) 
(Emphasis added) 
Nor was she uncertain about it being capital, divis-
ible upon dissolution, as opposed to capital or loan 
returnable to Rulon en toto : 
Q.: (Roe) It was your understanding that, if the 
partnership were ever terminated, by whatever means,_ 
you would get 20 cents of every dollar he (Rulon) put in? 
A.: Mister, I have asked you to read that; it 
speaks for itself. (Referring to Articles) 
Q.: I am just asking you for your understanding. 
A: That was my understanding . ... I figured 
these documents were legal. I figured they were legal all 
the way through; and when it was said and signed, that 
was it. ( R. 180-181 ) (Emphasis added) 
This is clear reference to original talk and writings. 
Terry testified that at the original conversations with 
his father prior to forming the partnership they dis-
cussed that his father was a wealthy man, that he had 
given considerable thought to estate planning and dis-
tributing part of his estate to his children ( R. 141-2 ) ; 
that if he quit college and forsook a professional career 
he wanted some assurance that his father would carry 
through with the promise to actually give him an equity 
in the business, upon dissolution or a business failure, not 
just a nebulous chance to make some profits. (R. 132-3; 
320) Terry had lived for much of his life with his 
mother when Rulon was away most of the time and 
when home was continually quarreling with Flora 
over money and financial matters. It is obvious he had 
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some concern about his father's arbitrariness. (R. 327-
329) Terry was agreeable that the total capital con-
tributed by Rulon remain in a capital account in Rulon's 
name to draw interest if profits were made until dis-
solution; (R. 112-113) that at no time did Rulon ever 
claim his contributions would be loans: 
"During my whoi~ business affairs with my 
father, we have never discussed or even mentioned 
notes or loans.'' (R. 272, line 24) 
That Rulon specifically told him in the first pre-
partnership meeting that he would not expect the 
return of his capital; ( R. 111-112) and that he never 
received the letters requesting notes (Exs. 9, 10) Rulon 
said he sent to him. (R. 272) 
In February 1960, prior to dissolution, Rulon took 
Terry to talk with Mr. Wunderli and Mr. Holdsworth, 
lawyers in the firm now representing him. Terry testi-
fied that Rulon told him at this meeting he wanted Terry 
to get most of his part of Rulon's estate through the 
partnership. Extensive discussion was had by Rulon, 
Terry and Holdsworth at this point, and by clear im-
plication Rulon's intentions on this matter related back 
to the inception of the partnership. ( R. 141-143) 
Rulon at no time during the trial repudiated this, 
nor were Holdsworth and Wunderli produced at trial 
to change this impression. 
Thus we observe substanital bodies of evidence to 
the effect that the parties intended at all times, and 
particularly at the inception of the partnership, that the 
sums contributed by Rulon initially and to be contributed 
thereafter were to be distributed upon dissolution pro-
portionally to the parties 40, 40 and 20, but that prior 
to dissolution partners were to receive interest on their 
capital accounts as the first step in the distribution of 
profits. 
FINDING NO. 3, (R. 65) that its was the intent 
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of the parties that interest at the rate of 5% per annum 
was to paid to partners on their capital accounts out of 
gross profits, has been discussed supra. The finding re-
garding the intent that interest was cumulative and that 
it should be credited to a liability account of the partner-
ship payable to the partner earning the interest will be 
discussed at argument VIII infra, because respondents 
seek a reversal of that part of the finding. 
FINDING NO. 4 ( R. 66), that the parties in-
tended that partnership profits should be distributed to, 
and losses borne by, the partners in the proportions of 
40%, 40%, and 20% to Rulon, Terry and Flora re-
spectively, is apparently not challenged by appellant. 
There is of course ample testimony that this was the 
intent of the parties. See especially Roberts' testimony 
(R. 94), where Rulon and Terry directed Roberts to so 
provide. 
In the second part of finding No. 4, the court 
states "To fulfill the intent of the parties in connection 
with items of interest on capital accounts, and of profits 
and losses, it is necessary to make the following account-
ing entries : " Then follows the dollar amount entries 
to which counsel stipulated as being correct as to the 
court's accounting theory. 
The interest amounts set forth as earned on capital 
balances in years when profits were made and to be 
credited to a liability account of the partnership payable 
to partners and not to a capital account, will be chal-
lenged at VIII infra, as referred to earlier herein. 
FINDING NO. 5. (R. 69) The evidence regarding 
the intent of the parties that R.ulon's payments into the 
partnership were on account of capital and not by way of 
loan has been discussed above. The findings that the pay-
ments he made prior to December 3, 1958, totaling 
$119,224.00 were used in the business for capital purposes 
and credited to his capital account has been demon-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
strated. Rulon never seriously challenged this handling of 
the money and when some effort at the trial was made to 
assert use of the money for other than capital purposes, 
he finally testified that of the total of $150,000 he had 
committed to the venture, all but one $60 item and one 
$900 item had gone into capital expenditures. (R. 168-
170) 
FINDING NO. 6 (R. 69) that the payments total-
ing $29,645.39 paid by Rulon after December 3, 1958, 
were "not intended to be paid in as contributions to 
capital, and were not intended to be distributed to 
partners upon dissolution" is challenged by respondents 
at VIII infra as being without evidentiary support. 
FINDING NO. 7 (R. 70) is a factual statement 
of stipulation by the parties that the dissolution date was 
March 21, 1960. 
FINDING NO. 8 (R. 70). The detailed wording 
of this finding is here commended to the Court. In 
substance the court found the parties intended: 
1. Upon dissolution the business would be wound 
up by paying liabilities, including liabilities to partners 
not in respect of capital. 
2. That, specifically, the phrase "liabilities to part-
ners" used at paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agreement 
was not intended to refer to capital accounts of the 
partners. 
3. The net assets remaining after payment of lia-
bilities were intended by the parties to then be dis-
tributed to Rulon, Terry and Flora 40, 40 and 20. 
In this connection the witnesses testified as follows: 
TERRY: Testified that the accounting entry he 
made subsequent to dissolution transferring the total of 
all capital accounts to Rulon, himself and Flora in the 
40, 40, 20 proportions was pursuant to an oral a.g:ee-
ment with his father prior to the Articles, the provisions 
of the Articles themselves, his father's letter of Dissolu-
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tion, the Dissolution Agreement, the Supplemental 
Agreement, and oral commitments with his father upon 
the occasions of the signing of all documents. (R. 132-3) 
That he, his father and attorney Holdsworth dis-
cussed, prior to dissolution, that he would receive 40% 
of the capital accounts of the business upon dissolution. 
(R. 144-5) 
That in conversations with his sisters and others of 
the family he told them he had the following interests 
in the business: $2000-3000 in his capital account, a 
$500 monthly salary, and "if and when a dissolution ever 
came * * * that at that time I would have 40% of the 
capital account of El Rancho Enterprises, pursuant to 
an agreement made by myself and my father." (R. 277-8) 
His position has been consistent at all times on this 
point - that he did not come into 40% of his father's 
contribution until dissolution. (R. 278) 
He testified he believed that all three documents 
embodied this intent and this concept, and particularly 
paragraphs 6 and 12 of the Articles as re-stated by 
paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agreement (R. 280, 
lines 22 to 30, 282, lines 1 to 3) . 
He testified that he never at any time intended to 
receive only 40% of what was left after his father had 
been repaid his total contribution. ( R. 282) 
On the point that "liabilities to partners" did not 
include capital he was firm: He testified that at the 
Murray meeting with Rulon, Wunderli and Schoenhals, 
he specifically discussed the phrase "liabilities to part-
ners" with Rulon and Wunderli. 
Q.: Was it your intent the phrase, "liabilities to 
partners" included your father's capital account? 
A.: Absolutely not. 
Q.: Did you have any discussion with your father 
at that meeting? 
A.: Yes. 
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i\.: Did you discuss with him the phrase "liabili-
ties to partners" in the Dissolution Agreement? 
A.: Yes. 
Q.: State in substance and effect, or if you can 
remember, exactly what you said and what he said. 
A.: I asked my father, and his attorney, why they 
had included "liabilities to partners" in this Dissolution 
Agreement they drew up. Mr. Wunderli told me it was 
his knowledge that mother had made business loans, and 
at the time he drew up that dissolution agreement he 
did not know whether those loans had been paid off or 
not, and that this encompassed any liability that may 
or may not be on the books at the time of the final dis-
solution. I explained to him at that time there was, as 
of that date, April 2, there were no liabilities to partners 
upon the books of account. He told me rather than 
cross it out, that this may take a long time to wind up, 
and between now and actually winding up there could 
very possibly be liabilities to partners, such as wages to 
even myself. I told him I could see the possibility, and 
the phrase did not bother me in the least. (R. 284) 
RUTH WEST FRANCIS, Terry's sister and the 
daughter of Rulon and Flora, was deposed in her sick 
bed at her home in Kaysville, Utah, by Mr. Ronnow 
and Mr. Roe on April 13, 1964, two days before .the 
trial commenced. She was married, the mother of four, 
and the next to oldest of the West children. 
She testified that on or about April 2, 1960, she 
V\'as at her mother's home in Salt Lake City, and Rulon 
told her he had just come from a meeting with Terry 
and the attorneys i~ Murray. That he was "happy and 
very much relieved"; he said "they had reached a 
dissolution of this partnership and that they had reached 
a settlement"; that "out of the goodness of his heart 
he had given Terry his share in the partnership and 
Mother her share"; that the "shares" would be $60,000 
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to Terry and $30,000 to Mother; that it would be tax 
free; that "this was a portion of their inheritance. It 
was a portion of Terry's inheritance and that Terry 
would have it now." (R. 209-210) 
She testified that in her presence the following 
morning Rulon stated to Donna Holmes (another sister) 
and Roy Holmes, her husband, substantially the same 
thing, including the dollar amounts of $60,000 and 
$30,000 which Terry and Flora were getting. (R. 211-
12) 
Neither of the Holmes', produced as friendly wit-
nesses by Rulon, denied Ruth's testimony. 
Ruth also testified that Rulon had told her at this 
time that he had discussed with Terry the matter of 
Terry buying Rulon's portion or share, contra that Terry 
was categorically to buy Rulon out as stated by Mr. 
Roe in his brief at page 14. (R. 257, lines 19-22) (Em-
phasis added) 
Rulon said no word in the trial to deny this con-
versation with his daughter or repudiate its effect. He 
must be deemed to have agreed that he said these things 
and that he did the things that he said. Since the dollar 
amounts of $60,000 to Terry and $30,000 to Flora are 
40% and 20%, respectively, of the round total of 
$150,000 he had contributed to the venture, and since 
what he agreed to on April 2nd was fully in keeping 
with the wording of the original Articles, he is deemed 
to be supporting the contention of respondents that it 
was the intent of the parties at all times to distribute all 
capital or net assets at dissolution regardless of who had 
contributed it. 
One brief line from Flora's testimony reflects she 
held the view that before dissolution she would get 
profits, upon dissolution a percentage of all capital, in-
cluding Terry's. 
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Q.: It was your understanding that you would be 
the owner of 20 per cent of that (Terry's investment) 
A. : Of what he put in? 
Q.: Yes. 
A.: That all depended. * * * if the thing was 
sold, you know what happens. If it isn't sold, I come in 
for profits. ( R. 182) (Emphasis added) 
MR. E. L. SCHOENHALS called by respondents 
and cross-examined at length by appellants testified re-
garding distribution as follows: That Mr. Wunderli had 
prepared the dissolution agreement, had sent it to 
Schoenhals signed by Rulon requesting immediate sign-
ing by Terry because Rulon was leaving on a trip and 
wanted the matter settled before he left, that Schoenhals 
and Wunderli agreed that a supplemental agreement 
stating that Terry and Flora were getting their shares 
by way of gift and Rulon would file a gift tax return 
should be prepared to clarify the estate situation; that 
Schoenhals prepared it and he and Wunderli rode to-
gether to the Murray meeting. (R. 337-9) That at the 
meeting Rulon said he wanted to get back 40% of ap-
proximately $147,000 he had put in, (R-334-5); that 
there was some discussion of Terry's buying out Rulon's 
40% but that nothing was done about that (R. 336); 
that Wunderli or Rulon discussed the point that by 
Terry's receiving the "gift" he would be eliminated from 
Rulon's will because he would be getting all he was 
entitled to in Rulon's estate, (R. 337); that Terry's 
signing the Dissolution Agreement was dependent upon 
Rulon's agreeing to file a gift tax return ( R. 338) ; that 
he heard discussion by Terry and Wunderli regarding 
the phrase "liabilities to partners" but did not enter this 
discussion ( R. 343) . 
Rulon was recalled in rebuttal immediately follow-
ing Schoenhals' testimony and while stating that very 
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little was said at the Murray meeting he did not deny 
the specifics of Schoenhals' testimony. ( R. 344-350) 
Persons are deemed to intend the clear legal and 
factual import of the words they use in their contracts. 
Rulon had his attorney Wunderli draw the Dis-
solution Agreement. (R. 348-9) The phrase "liabilities 
to partners" used therein was put to both Rulon's C.P.A., 
Mr. Kenneth A. Elwood, and respondents' professional 
witness, Mr. Paul D. Tanner, at the trial for definition. 
Mr. Elwood and Mr. Tanner have had 10 and 22 years 
experience, respectively as certified public accountants. 
Mr. Roe called Mr. Elwood as an expert. He pre-
sented him as being particularly conversant with partner-
ship accounting. (R. 190, 194, lines 19-25) He testified 
upon questioning by Judge Jeppson: 
Q.: You used this word "liability" to refer to 
debts to third persons, I suppose, and also loans from 
partners? 
A. : Loans from partners would be included in 
liability accounts. 
Q.: As a matter of fact, isn't "liability" often used 
and broad enough to include an interest of partners with 
relation to their capital investments? 
A.: No, sir, I don't believe so. 
Q. : In common use, do they ever put liabilities to 
include the capital without saying "liabilities, plus capi-
tal ... just assets and liabilities? 
A. : I have trouble following your question. I 
would think not. 
Q.: You haven't ran (run) into that use of the 
word "liability" to include the capital? 
A.: No. The capital is not a liability. (R. 195) 
(Emphasis added) 
Mr. Tanner verified this concept : 
Q.: How would you characterize or define "lia-
bilities to partners"? 
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A.: Liabilities to partners, if they exist in the form 
of a loan, as such, to the partnership, simply show it in 
the general liabilities of the balance sheet, as separate 
and distinct from the capital account. 
Q. : You almost answered my (next) question: 
is a liability to partners the same as his capital account? 
A.: No. (R. 233) 
When the court caused Title 48-1-37 U.C.A. 1953 
to be read to Mr. Elwood with the implication that 
that part of the Partnership Act defines capital as a 
liability of the partnership, the witness responded he 
felt the Act showed the chronological order of payment 
rather than a definition contra to his testimony. (R. 
199-200) 
Tanner testified that there would be no difference 
in the "assets" distributable to partners as stated in the 
Articles at paragraph 12, and "net assets" distributable 
under paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agreement. That 
in each case the phrases referred to capital or net worth. 
( R. 2 3 7-8) Tanner finally testified that this wording 
would prevail, in practice, even if one partner had con-
tributed substantially all of the capital, because the 
agreement so provided. ( R. 241 ) 
FINDING NO. 10 (R. 70-71): "That the parties 
and particularly . . . Rulon and Terry, intended and 
understood that the effect of the agreements whereby 
Terry and Flora would receive, upon dissolution, 40% 
and 20%, respectively, of the amounts paid into capital 
by Rulon as finally adjusted and determined herein, was 
that such receipt was by way of gift from Rulon to 
Terry and Flora." 
Argument here will show the affirmative intent of 
the parties in this regard under (A) infra, and will 
answer appellant's argument III that this finding "was 
not supported by sufficient evidence and was erroneous 
as a matter of law" at (B) infra. 
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(A) As to the intention of the parties that the 
total effect of the agreements was that a gift came into 
being, the evidence is certainly not wanting: The un-
challenged testimony was that Rulon had done estate 
planning, that Holdsworth and Wunderli had counselled 
him in this regard, and in the presence of Terry weeks 
prior to dissolution. (R. 141-143) Estate planning in-
variably involves tax considerations. At the scene of the 
ending of the partnership we have the two principal 
parties, Rulon and Terry, and their lawyers, discussing 
all these matters. A dissolution agreement has been 
drawn by Wunderli to effect the winding up. ( R. 348-9) 
By its terms and the terms of the Articles of Partnership, 
which it replaced, Terry and Flora were receiving sixty 
and thirty thousand dollars, respectively, of money which 
had originated with Rulon. Discussion was had regard-
ing tax treatment of these monies, particularly gift, 
as opposed to income tax consideration. ( R. 293-4) 
Terry testified that at the Murray meeting it was 
decided to sell the motel (paragraph 1 of Dissolution 
Agreement, Ex. 2) in the winding up. That his father 
then said "he didn't know how much (it was) going to 
be sold for, but assuming . . . assuming we sold it for 
book value, or in those words, what it was of that day 
* * * that there would be approximately $150,000 to 
be distributed, and I would receive 40% of that sum, 
which would be tax free." (R. 131) (Emphasis added) 
Terry further testified he was concerned that the 
Internal Revenue would tax his 40% as income, and 
"that is what led me to have my attorney Ed Schoenhals 
draw up the Supplemental Agreement to show that 
this was a gift, tax free." That he discussed the Sup-
plemental Agreement, and he told his father of his con-
cern regarding income tax. That it would be a tax 
advantage to his father in getting portions of his estate 
transferred without tax. That his father said there was 
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no reason to pay the income tax and he was in complete 
agreement to sign the Supplemental Agreement for tax 
purposes. ( R. 293-4) 
On this point Rulon testified that Schoenhals pre-
sented the Supplemental Agreement to him, told him 
about a $30,000 gift tax exemption in each himself and 
his wife, suggested he and his wife give Terry a $60,000 
gift, and he then signed the Supplemental Agreement, 
stating this gift concept. (R. 34 7) In this connection 
reference is again made to Rulon's report to his daughter, 
Mrs. Francis, following the Murray meeting: that he 
had given $60,000 to Terry and $30,000 to Flora, that 
Terry's was part of his inheritance and would be tax free. 
(See page 15 supra. also Schoenhals testimony regard-
ing gift discussions of Murray meeting at page 16 supra). 
(Emphasis added) . 
The foregoing evidence is abundantly persuasive of 
the validity of the finding that Rulon and Terry "in-
tended" and "understood" that the "effect" of the agree-
ments was that Terry's and Flora's share came by way 
of gift. 
(B) The questions as to whether in fact a gift was 
made, or when it was made are clearly outside the scope 
of the issues here. The writer will not be led off into the 
morass where Mr. Roe's will-o' -the-wisps of donative 
intent, capacity, delivery and consideration invite him. 
The Supplemental Agreement, as this court stated, 
does not clearly indicate a present donative intent, but its 
wording could not be clearer in declaring that a com-
pleted gift had been made prior to its execution. 
Mr. Roe's heading at his Argument III, first of all, 
wrongly states the finding. He says: "The Court's finding 
that amounts awarded to defendants were by way of gift, 
is not supported, etc.'' (Emphasis Added) 
The court did not award by way of gift. Let us be 
clear on this. The court said Rulon and Terry "intended 
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and understood that the effect of the agreements" was 
that Terry and Flora received by way of gift. This dis-
tinction is real and not technical. This is an entirely 
different matter than the court making its award on the 
theory of gift. 
While the parties clearly intended and believed that 
a gift had been made it is completely academic in the 
affirmance of the judgment whether a gift was made or 
not. The judgment does not rise or fall on gift. The total 
import of the findings, conclusions and judgment is that 
the parties agreed that Rulon was to put up capital, 
Terry was to change his life's course and operate the 
venture, profits and losses were to be proportionately 
taken and borne by the parties, the parties were to receive 
interest on their invested capital, and upon dissolution, 
net assets or capital was to be distributed in the propor-
tions herein repeatedly stated. These intentions were 
expressly written in the Articles, and in the Dissolution 
Agreement as amplified by the Supplemental Agreement. 
This result is the result of rights and obligations 
arising from basic contract law. Ambiguity was originally 
thought by this court to obtain in regard to whether 
Rulon's money was loan or capital. That ambiguity has 
been removed by a scholarly and arduous search on the 
part of the trial court. 
Evidence of tax talk and of gift talk by the parties 
has here been adduced by the writer to show the basic 
contract intent, not to show gift intent per se, although 
it is clear that a gift had in fact been made as a result 
of the operation of all agreements. Rulon agreed to file 
a return to implement this concept. 
As this court stated in Wood v. Wood, 89 Utah 394, 
49 Pac. 2nd 416, 422, the court is impressed with "natural 
behavior". What is more natural than for parties to seek, 
with the aid of counsel the most favorable tax treatment 
in a monetary situation? 
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Whether the taxing authorities ultimately impose 
income taxes upon Terry and Flora, or whether they 
allow the gift tax theory to prevail is of no concern here. 
II 
THE COURT'S FINDING AND CONCLU-
SION REGARDING THE DISSOLUTION AGREE-
MENT OF MARCH 31, 1960, AS TO INTENT AND 
ITS BINDING EFFECT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND APPLICABLE LAW. 
Two remarkable things about Mr. Roe's assault upon 
the Dissolution Agreement are, first, that his law firm 
prepared the agreement and urged its execution upon 
Terry, ( R. 3 38) , and secondly, that Mr. Roe himself in 
his first appeal herein argued that respondents were 
bound by it. ( (c) page 33, appellant's 1st Brief) A 
fortiori, if respondents are bound by it as the accepting 
offerees of the provisions contained therein, then Rulon 
is likewise bound by it as its drafter, its original signatory, 
and the offeror of its provisions. So, too, will it be most 
strictly construed against him as its drafter. On these two 
points the law is so well settled as to require no reference. 
A further bar to appellant's attack on this agreement 
is that its validity was not in issue at the trial. The pre-
trial order as it relates to the agreement reads: "The 
pleadings herein will determine the issues with the follow-
ing exceptions and amendments: 
1. * * * 
2. * * * 
3. It appears to the court that the issues to be 
determined are: 
(a) What is the meaning * * * of the dissolution 
agreement signed by the parties and acknowledged on 
the 31st day of March, 1960, by Rulon R. West?" 
(Emphasis Added) 
This court has held that where an issue was not 
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framed in the pre-trial order, and not raised by introduc-
tion of evidence at the trial, it cannot be raised on appeal. 
Upton vs. Heiselt et al. 118 Ut. 573, 223 P. 2nd., 428. 
Respondents by Answer and Counterclaim had 
asserted the operation of the agreement and appellant 
had replied it was never executed. Appellant did not 
carry this position into the pre-trial and had, indeed, 
argued before this Court on first appeal the binding 
nature of the Agreement on respondents, and had used 
its terms as the basis for his claim that "liabilities to 
partners" included Rulon's contributions which should be 
returned. This court apparently accepted appellant's 
urging of the validity of the agreement upon it, because 
in its remand it stated only the document was "am-
biguous" and the intent of the parties in executing it 
should be determined by the trial court. 
Thus, a determination of "intent" in execution, by 
the wording of the remand, and "meaning" in the word-
ing of the pre-trial order, were the tasks assigned to the 
trial judge. No challenge of invalidity, of improper execu-
tion or of incomplete integration was raised. 
At trial, Mr. Roe objected to the admission of Ex. 
15, Terry's and Flora's copy of the Agreement, signed 
by all parties. The court admitted the exhibit. Mr. Roe 
made no motion to amend the pre-trial order to raise the 
issue of invalidity. Nor did he enlarge his claim beyond 
objecting to admission. ( R. 290) 
Nor did the trial court find the agreement was valid 
or invalid. He found that the "intent of the parties" in 
regard to distribution of net assets in the 40, 40 and 20 
percentages was expressed at paragraphs 12 and 6 of 
the Articles, and at paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agree-
ment. He also found that the parties did not intend that 
the phrase "liabilities to partners" as used in the Dissolu-
tion Agreement should include the capital accounts of 
the parties which, of course, by definition is that they 
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affirmatively intended that capital accounts were not 
included in "liabilities to partners." (R. 70) 
· The court made no other finding regarding this 
Agreement. The court followed the mandate of this Court 
and the pre-trial order: he found intent and meaning. 
He obviously assumed the agreement was valid (i.e. 
integrated or consummated and legal) and sought only 
to remove any ambiguity therefrom. This is shown in his 
1st Conclusion of Law: "The parties and each of them 
are bound by the terms and provisions of . . . the Articles 
of Partnership and the Dissolution Agreement, as said 
agreements have been interpreted and construed in the 
Findings of Fact." This was his assignment. That he 
fulfilled it is manifest. 
The foregoing should be dispositive of the point. 
But to advert briefly, if academically, to Mr. Roe's argu-
ment re validity, his challenge seems based chiefly on 
Flora's failure to sign the agreement promptly. (Appel-
lant's brief pp 21-22) 
Let us be practical here, and adult. Every person in 
this case, including the two trial judges, and Mr. Roe, 
knows that this grieving woman has at all times been 
virtually on the sidelines as to negotiations and participa-
tion. Terry and Rulon set up a 20% interest for her 
almost without her knowledge, and explained to her what 
she was getting in the Articles she was signing. ( R. 17 4-5) 
Moreover, she affirmatively consented to be bound 
by their decisions in partnership matters: 
A. : Well no; he (Rulon) knew . . . I just told him, 
I told them both, I said, "whatever you and Terry do in 
these matters of money or anything else is okay with me". 
(R. 182) (Emphasis added) 
First of all there was absolutely no intent proven at 
trial that all three parties had to sign. Mr. Roe asserts 
that the only "reasonable inference is that none was to be 
bound until the dissolution agreement had been executed 
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by all". This inference comes right out of "Alice in Won-
derland", because he produced no word of testimony to 
this effect at the trial. Moreover, the actions of the parties, 
viz., Rulon and Terry in going forward with the winding 
up pursuant to the terms of the agreement, particularly 
the intervention of Ray Holmes in the situation as Rulon's 
agent, and Flora's assent and acceptance of benefits under 
the agreement are eloquent of total intent that Flora's 
signature was not necessary to render the agreement 
binding. 
In this situation, Flora's signature is not required by 
law: 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, page 408: SIGNATURE, reads: 
"In the absence of statute requiring a signature, or an 
agreement that the contract shall not be binding until it 
is signed, parties may become bound by the terms of the 
contract, where their assent is otherwise indicated, such 
as by the acceptance of benefits under the contract." 
Further: "The fact that one of the parties has signed the 
contract does not necessarily require that the other party 
should do likewise," citing WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 
3rd Ed., para. 90A, and cases, including U.S.F.&G. Co. v. 
Reno Electrical Works, 43 Nev. 191, 183 P. 386, where 
it was stated: "Parties may adopt a written contract and 
thus make it binding as though formally executed by both, 
without signing it." (Emphasis Added) 
See also Re,d Fish Boat Co. v. Jarvis Press, Inc., 361 
S.W. 2d, 588, 1963, stating: "A person may sign contract 
and be bound by writing though other party to agree-
ment signifies acceptance only by acts, conduct or ac-
quiescence" and N.L.R.B. v. Local 825 Intern. Union of 
Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 315 F. 2d, 695 (1964): 
"A written contract though signed only by one party 
binds the other if he accepts it and both act in reliance 
on it as a valid contract." 
Flora did, in fact, sign. (Ex. 15) 
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She also accepted the provisions of the agreement 
and the benefits accruing to her thereunder. (R. 23-25) 
She was named a defendant in this action upon the theory 
she claimed under this and the other documents ad-
versely to Rulon's interests. 
The human, practical reasons for her not signing 
immediately seem clearly that Rulon and Terry were 
making the arrangements for her benefit, and did not in 
fact, ask her to sign, (she was not even invited to the 
Murray meeting) and that she affirmatively believed she 
was part of the dissolution agreement without signing. 
Q.: When did you do it? (sign) Was it after this 
case was filed? 
A. : Oh yes, I guess it was. I don't know just when 
it was. I couldn't say just when it was. But I do know 
that . . . I do know that . . . as I remember it ... that 
before there "vas any signing or anything as far as I was 
concerned the gift was given to us." (Flora Desposition) 
Mr. Roe argues that since "the agreement is not 
necessarily "beneficial" to her (if she really believed her-
self already entitled to 20% of Rulon's capital), her 
assent cannot be presumed" (Appellant's brief p 22) This 
is ridiculous. The agreement is highly beneficial to her, 
because it ties Rulon more closely than ever to his original 
commitment that Flora will receive 20% of the net assets 
upon dissolution. This is the husband who for years has 
contested money matters with her, has been substantially 
estranged from her and with whom she would now, 
naturally, seek the most binding arrangements. (R. 151, 
300, 301, 320, 321, 323-330) 
III 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT HEREUNDER IS 
ANSWERED BY RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON 
PAGE 18 SUPRA. 
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IV 
NO ERROR WAS MADE BY THE COURT IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO AMEND FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
JUDGMENT. 
That the court found the intent of the parties as it 
was directed by the remand of this court has been demon-
strated herein, particularly at argument I supra. 
The requirement of Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that the court shall find the facts specially 
has likewise been met as shown in the entire argument 
herein but particularly I supra, and as will be shown 
further at VI infra. 
The court did not ignore the judgment of the Mas-
ter's findings herein entered February 27, 1963. He took 
particular notice of it in the last paragraph of the judg-
ment and. therein specifically tied the two judgments 
together (R. 74) The receiver will have no difficulty 
disbursing funds upon termination of the receivership 
because it is, by the conclusions and judgment herein, 
directed to proceed in conformity with the procedures 
enunciated. (R. 72, 74) Dollar amounts are set forth in 
the judgment on the Master's findings and in the jud·g-
ment herein appealed from. No difficulty will be ex-
perienced by the receiver in arriving at final figures other 
than possible slight dollar amounts that can be reconciled 
by a modicum of intelligent application. 
The argument regarding Terry's salary will be an-
swered fully at IX infra, where it will be shown that 
Terry's salary was an expense and not dependent upon 
profits as Mr. Roe seems to believe. 
v 
COSTS WERE PROPERLY AWARDED TO 
RESPONDENTS. 
Rule 54 (d) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
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that costs "shall be allowed as of course to the prevail-
ing party, unless the Court otherwise directs." Appellant's 
argument that he prevailed by having a dissolution, 
winding up and distribution effected is specious and, 
under the facts, forlorn. He sought not a winding up and 
distribution per se, but these steps as incidental to his 
main goal of getting back all the money he had con-
tributed to the venture. He sought to prevent respon-
dents from having any distributive share. The court gave 
them some $69,000 of the $150,000 capital. The respon-
dents are the prevailing parties on the ultimate issue liti-
gated. 
VI 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ARE IN FACT THE 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE COURT AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH HIS 
MINUTE ENTRY AND WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Roe's assertion that counsel for defendants pre-
pared the findings of fact herein with the implication 
that the court signed them with indifference, if not 
blindly, is unwarranted. 
Judge Jeppson exhibited particular interest in this 
case. Prior to trial his attention was called by counsel 
to the requirement of this Court in its remand to deter-
mine the intent of the parties in executing the three 
agreements. He entered actively into the interrogation 
of witnesses himself during trial, as the record shows, -
particularly the accounting witnesses - and in some in-
stances the family witnesses. (R. 195, 225-231) He 
prohibited leading questions by counsel and voluntarily 
struck questions and answer in such cases where no ob-
jection was entered. (R. 336) At the conclusion of the 
trial he entertained lengthy argument - two and one 
half hours to the side. 
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He entered his Minute Entry of Decision on April 
21, 1964, four days after the trial closed. His main topic 
sentence in the Minute Entry states "The intention of 
the parties to the Articles as to the meaning of the Ar-
ticles requires the following : " thence setting forth the 
accounting entry adjustments he had decided were neces-
sary to comport with the evidence and with law. 
The wording of the Minute Entry is in traditional 
brevity. 
The court invited counsel for respondents to prepare 
detailed findings and conclusions and himself set con-
ferences with counsel to discuss the wording once it had 
been formulated. At least two such conferences were 
held with both Mr. Roe and the writer, at which both 
Terry and Rulon were present at least once each. The 
court indicated at the first conference he had given con-
siderable study to the wording of the findings and 
conclusions submitted to him and desired to make several 
changes therein. The wording of the findings was then 
discussed by the court at length - indeed, even argued 
out among counsel and the court. The court struck some 
wording, revised other wording and actively indicated 
the final wording he would approve. 
Prior to the signing of the final judgment and for 
about six weeks subsequent to the submission of the draft 
of findings to the court by the writer, both counsel worked 
on a dollar amount accounting which was stipulated 
to as representing the court's legal and accounting theory 
in the case and appears in the findings in No. 4. 
Subsequent to signing the judgment and upon hear-
ing Mr. Roe's Motion To Amend, the court heard an-
other two hour argument by Mr. Roe and still refused 
to adopt his theory of the case. 
The writer realizes that both his averments here, 
as well as Mr. Roe's regarding this point are outside 
the written record, but he submits them in good faith 
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in -response to the unfortunate charge that the court 
abdicated his responsibility. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
VII 
THE· COURT'S FINDING NO. 6, THAT THE 
AMOUNTS PAID INTO THE PARTNERSHIP BY 
RULON ON AND AFTER DECEMBER 3, 1958, 
WERE NOT INTENDED AS CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
CAPITAL NOR TO BE DISTRIBUTED PROPOR-
TIONATELY TO PARTNERS UPON DISSOLU-
TION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND IS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Rulon paid $119,224.00 into the partnership prior 
to December 3, 1958 and $29,645.35 after that date. 
(R. 69) 
Over respondent's objections that they were self-
serving the Court admitted a copy of a letter Rulon 
claimed to have sent to Terry on Dec. 3, 1958 and an-
other dated December 10, 1959. These are Exhibits 9 
and 10 respectively. Exhibit 9 contains a list of some 29 
checks by date and amount representing the payments 
made by Rulon into the partnership venture to that date. 
The letter recites that Rulon is enclosing a series of notes 
as per "our mutual understanding" to bear interest at 
5% and to represent his payments theretofore made into 
the company. Exhibit 10 is another reference to the 
same matter. 
It is obvious from the pleadings and the trial record 
that Appellant did not claim December 3, 1958 as a 
cut-off date when capital contributions changed to loans. 
He presented the two exhibits and the testimony regard-
ing them as proving his basic claim that all monies he 
had advanced were by way of loan. 
The writer believes that Appellant and Mr. Roe 
were as surprised as he that the Court deemed Dec. 8, 
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1958 as a date when a relationship changed. The letters 
themselves make no claim for December 8, as a cut-off 
date. Deciding that all monies paid in by Rulon prior 
to said date were capital contributions while all monies 
paid in thereafter were loans is completely out of con-
text with the pleadings, the weight of the evidence and 
the contentions of the parties at all stages of litigation. 
"It is improper to make a finding which is not war-
ranted by the pleadings, evidence, or stipulated facts, and 
wholly at variance UJith the claims of either party." 89 
C.J.S., 462. (Emphasis added) 
The decision was .particularly unfounded as to 
the evidence. 
As to law it is erroneous and cannot stand: ( 1) It 
is based solely on self -serving and inadmisable evidence, 
and ( 2) it seeks to impose a contract of loan which is 
always bilateral, upon the parties by proof only of a 
unilateral intent of one party. 
As to ( 1 ) : The admission of this type of self -serving 
evidence violates the rule against hearsay. 
20 Am. Jur. § 558, evidence: "Self-serving dec-
larations: There is a general rule that self-serving 
declarations, defined as statements favorable to the 
interest of the declarant, are not admissable into evidence 
as proof of the facts asserted, whether they arose from 
acts and conduct or were made orally or were reduced to 
writing. The vital objection to the admission of this kind 
of evidence is its hearsay character. Furthermore, such 
declarations are untrustworthy; to permit their intro-
duction in evidence would open the door to frauds and 
perjuries." (Emp. Added) The notation cites many cases, 
including Dempsey v. Dobson, 174 Pa. 122, 34 A. 459, 
32 L.R.A. 764, wherein it was held: "An unanswered 
letter containing the writer's argumentative presentation 
of his view of his rights * * * is a declaration in his own 
behalf and inadmissable ~ his favor." 
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To the same point is the opinion of our court cited 
favorably in other jurisdictions that: "The letter from 
plaintiff to deceased is purely a self-serving document, 
and aside from the effect of the statute (dead man) or 
other connecting evidence, was properly rejected by the 
trial court." Clayton v. Ogden St.ate Bank, 82 Utah, 564, 
26 P2, 545. In Clayton the letter was offered to show 
a contract with the deceased and in addition to its being 
in violation of the so-called dead-man's statute, it was 
inadmissable as self-serving. (Emphasis added) 
The cases are legion on the point. In some courts 
where there was proof the addressee had received the 
letter the tendency is to be less strict on admissability, but, 
the great weight is against admissability, and the total 
weight seems against admissability where it is just a 
carbon of a letter alleged to have been sent with no 
independent proof of its having been received. 
No independent evidence of receipt was adduced 
and Terry categorically denied receiving the two com-
munications or either of them, and denied emphatically 
he had discussed loans with his father at any time. 
(R. 273) 
This court has apparently not more recently than 
Clayton, supra, ruled on the point but a well reasoned 
opinion in the State of Washington is here commended. 
In Conner Co. v. McCollister and Campbell Inc. 115 
P.2, 370, we read: "So, if plaintiff is to recover, it must 
be on the theory that there was an express agreement on 
the part of McCollister and Campbell to pay a com-
mission. The only evidence that there was any such 
agreement is contained in appellant's (plaintiffs) letter 
of May 3rd, in which it laid claim to a commission. This 
letter, of course, was a self-serving declaration and was 
inadmissable;" (Emp. Added) citing cases and 2 JONES, 
COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2nd. Ed.), 1636 
§ 895 : " * * * I would obviously be unsafe if parties to 
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litigation, without restriction, were allowed to support 
their claims by proving their own statements made out 
of court. Such a practice would be open to all the 
objections which exist against the admission of heresay 
in general, and would also open the door to fraud and 
the fabrication of testimony." (Italics by the Washington 
Court.) The court finally ruled that even though the 
letter in that case had been admitted without objection, 
it should not have been and could possess no probative 
value. 
But, even if exhibits 9 and 10 were admissable, 
taken in the light most favorable to appellant, their 
,veight is merely added to the weight of this entire record, 
namely that Rulon wanted some interest on the money 
he had put into the business. No more, no less. 
The courts' decision that these two letters effected 
a cut-off date as between capital and loan is completely 
unfounded. This thought didn't even enter Rulon's mind. 
If he ever wrote such letters he was saying he wanted 
interest. In court he is now asking these self -serving letter 
copies to create a loan situation, not as of December 8, 
1958, but as of October 15, 1957, the date the venture 
was born. 
In order to have made this cut-off, the trial court 
must have believed that December 3rd was the first time 
Rulon had expressed his intent to his partners that he 
considered his payments as loans. If this be so, and it is 
the only plausible conclusion, then by definition the court 
must have believed that all talk and expressed intent 
theretofore sounded in capital, distributable, not loans. 
(2) That a loan is a bilateral contract arising from 
the mutual consent of two or more parties, and cannot be 
created by a unilateral intent or notion of one is so basic 
in law as to require no recitation of case or text law here. 
The finding should be changed to show all monies 
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contributed by Rulon, before and after December 3, 
1958 were paid in as capital and not as loans. 
VIII 
THE COURT'S FINDING (NO. 3) THAT 
INTEREST ON A PARTNER'S CAPITAL AC-
COUNT NOT PAID IN A GIVEN YEAR SHOULD 
BE CREDITED TO A LIABILITY ACCOUNT OF 
THE PARTNERSHIP, PAYABLE TO THE PART-
NER, AND SHOULD NOT BE CREDITED TO HIS 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE, IS COUNTER TO GENERALLY 
ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND IS 
ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In partnership accounting practice payment to a 
partner of annual interest on his capital account is a 
standard method of distributing profits. 
MASON, FUNDAMENTALS OF ACCOUNT-
ING, 2nd Ed. p 151 reads: "Frequently, however, the 
method of distribution (profits) will attempt to make 
allowances for differences in the positions of the partners 
as to such matters as Capital investment or time con-
tributed to partnership affairs. An "interest allowance" 
is often used to reflect the difference in capital invest-
ment; a designated percentage is applied to the balances 
of the capital accounts at the beginning of the period or 
to the average capital investment for the period and the 
results constitute a preliminary distribution of a portion 
of the net income." (Emphasis added) 
Accountant Tanner was asked if this were common 
practice, and he answered : 
"A. It is quite common; frequently a situation 
where partners will provide in the distribution of profits, 
one of the facts to be considered in the distribution of 
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profits in the matter of interest on capital accounts." 
(R. 219) (Emphasis Added) 
* * * * 
"0. You said this type of interest (payment) is 
""' 
clearly a distribution of profits; is that a fair statement? 
A. It is in the absence of any agreement to the 
contrary - it is considered a distribution of profits.'' 
(R. 223) 
Paragraph 4 of the Articles providing for the pay-
ment of 5% interest to partners on capital accounts out 
of gross profits and providing that the interest should 
be cumulative was read to him. When asked how a 
partner would be paid his interest payment under such 
contract terms he replied : 
"A. Paid directly at the time, or credited to his 
capital account, subject to drawings from time to time." 
Q. And - we are again talking about that interest 
being considered, accounting wise, as a distribution of 
profits to him; is that correct? 
A. Yes. (R. 229) (Emphasis Added) 
The Court challenged Mr. Tanner's opinion that 
interest if not paid to the partner, should be credited 
to his capital account. The record from page 224 to page 
231 reflects what the writer believes to be the Court's 
opinion that such interest should be carried in a liability 
account of the partnership payable to the partner, rather 
than in the partner's capital account. The Court so held 
in the finding, even though these pages will show the 
Court did not move Mr. Tanner from his opinion. We 
submit Mr. Tanner's is the correct position. 
The Court and Mr. Tanner were at variance as to 
what should be done about interest on partners capital 
accounts in years where the partnership made no profit 
from which to pay the interest. The Court argued that 
interest being "cumulative" would have to be carried 
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in a contingent liability account, but Mr .Tanner con-
sistently argued that it should not, that since the payment 
of such interest was a distribution of profits, in the years 
no profits were made, no interest was earned by the 
partner. That this did not affect its cumulative aspect: 
In years when profits were made interest for the current 
as well as past years would be paid from profits. (R. 
224-231) 
That Mr. Tanner persuaded the Court on this point 
is evident from the absence of any "contingent liability" 
finding. 
The intent of the parties regarding interest pay-
ments as written in paragraph 4 of the Articles is shown 
to co-incide with Mr. Tanner's delineation: 
Mr. Roe asked Terry if there was any discussion 
with Rulon about payment of interest, at the time the 
partnership was being formed. Terry answered: 
"I think I answered it; answer again - he said 
that, where he was contributing most of the capital out 
there - actually all of it except for a few dollars -
that he would expect, upon a distribution of profits, 
before I would get 40%, that the first step would be to 
give him a 5 per cent - or anybody a 5% interest on 
the capital balance, first; and then, the remainder would 
be distributed 40, 40, 20 under distribution of profits 
(par. 6, Articles). I said it was allright with me." (R. 
112-113) Rulon did not deny this talk. (Emphasis added) 
Terry testified also under Mr. Roe's questioning that 
all interest payments to partners were in fact credited to 
the capital accounts. That Rulon had been paid some 
$6,000 is reflected in the partnership income tax returns 
exhibits 4, 5, 6 & 7. (R. 137-138) 
The finding and judgment should be reversed, and 
ordered that in the accounting, interest when not paid 
to a partner should be credited to his capital account; 
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not to a liability account of the partnership, payable to 
the partner. 
IX 
THE COURT'S FINDING (NO. 3) THAT IN 
THE CALCULATION OF "GROSS PROFITS" 
SALARIES TO PARTNERS SHOULD NOT BE 
DEDUCTED FROM GROSS SALES OR INCOME 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
IS ERRONEOUS IN LAW. 
Article 5 reads: "The said Terry West shall be the 
manager of the partnership business and shall be entitled 
to draw up to but not exceeding the sum of $500 per 
month for his services, all amounts so drawn to be 
charged as a partnership expense and deducted before 
any division of net profits is made." (Emphasis added) 
This unambiguous wording clearly shows the intent 
of the partners in drafting the original Articles to be 
that Terry's salary was an expense item and not a 
distribution of profit to him. 
No evidence was adduced to establish another 
interpretation. 
The Court asked Mr. Tanner if in the or,dinary 
partnership salary to a partner would be something de-
ducted from income in order to determine profits. Mr. 
Tanner replied that unless otherwise agreed upon salaries 
to partners would be a distribution of profit rather than 
an expense item. (R. 247) This is the only testimony 
the writer can find on which the Court could have 
based his finding that salary to a partner should not be 
deducted as an expense in determining profit. It is clearly 
erroneous because here we have the clear wording of 
the parties showing they had "otherwise agreed", to use 
Tanner's words. 
The finding should be reversed, and the accounting 
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ordered to reflect Terry's salary as an expense item to 
be substracted from partnership receipts in calculating 
profits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court on remand was concerned about the in-
tent of the parties in executing contract documents mea-
sured against a background of their relationship to each 
other, "the purposes for which the documents were made, 
and principles of justice and equity relating thereto." 
The evidence has clearly shown a wealthy husband and 
father approaching an age when prudence dictated get-
ting property out of his estate into the hands of members 
of his family, in this instance his wife and son. His agree-
ment was generous, but in view of the personal relation-
ship it is not offensive to equity to interpret his commit-
ment as the trial court has done. 
Moreover, as to Terry at least, with whom Rulon 
chiefly bargained, there was full contractual considera-
tiop for Rulon's promises. Terry changed his life's work, 
terminated graduate work in college, gave full time to 
management of the venture, and received only a nominal 
wage from the partnership for three years in exchange for 
his father's promise that upon a business termination he 
would receive 40% of his father's contributions. Terry 
was promised a $500.00 salary but in fact drew less than 
25% of this amount. Equity is clearly not offended here. 
As to law, Rulon's commitments to Terry and Flora 
were plainly delineated in the agreements, which in the 
light of the evidence are not ambiguous. He agreed with 
them at paragraph 3 of the Articles that his contribu-
tions were by way of capital, and he agreed at para-
graphs 12 and 6 that upon dissolution his son and wife 
would get 60% of the assets which he had committed, 
after the obligations were paid. He consented anew to this 
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result in the unambiguous provisions of the Dissolution 
Agreement at a time when, if he had had any change 
of heart, he would have then declared it. Lastly, he af-
firmed again this specific intent and consent in an agree-
ment Supplemental to the Dissolution contract. 
Appellant would not, as he says in his conclusion, 
like a remand to the trial Judge to "himself" prepare 
the findings based on his impression of the evidence for 
the simple reason the trial Judge would find as he al-
ready has, except perhaps to vacate his finding on the 
December 3rd cut off date and allocate the $30,000.00 
contributed by Rulon after that date to capital as the evi-
dence shows it should be. 
Neither the Receiver, the parties nor the Judiciary 
will experience any real difficulty in making dollar amount 
calculations and disbursements based on the present state 
of the record, nor as it will stand after this court orders 
reversal on the three points argued by respondents at VII, 
VIII and IX herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTIAN RONNOW 
Mabey, Ronnow, Madsen & Marsden 
574 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Respondents and Cross-Appellants. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP 
This AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of the 15th 
day of October, A.D. 1957, by RULON R. WEST, TERRY R. 
WEST and FLORA E. WEST,-WITNESSETH: 
That the above named parties have associated themselves as 
partners under the firm name of EL RANCHO ENTERPRISES 
for the purposes and on the conditions herein recited.: 
1. The partnership business shall be that of operating motels, 
auto camps, trailer camps, tourst camps and allied businesses and 
shall be carried on at 5203 South State Street, in Murray City, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, or at such other place or places as the 
partners may from time to time agree upon. 
2. Said partnership shall continue until dissolved by the 
mutual consent of the partners or terminated by operation of law. 
3. The capital of the partnership shall consist of the following 
property: 
(a) A real estate contract covering the purchase by the part-
nership and the sale by Reed P. Mortensen and Ann S. Mortensen, 
his wife, of the Murray El Rancho Motel, including approximately 
four ( 4) acres of real property situated at 5203 South State Street, 
in Murray City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, including the 
personal property located in the sixteen motel units situated upon 
said real property upon which contract the said Rulon R. West 
has paid the sum of $47,500.00 and the sum of $1,000.00 cash in 
bank account also furnished by the said Rulon R. West. 
(b) Any further sums which any partner shall with the con-
sent of the other from time to time contribute for capital purposes 
which shall be credited to his caiptal account. 
4. Interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum shall 
be paid to each partner on the capital for the time being standing 
to his credit out of the gross profits of the business, and such in-
terest shall be cumulative, so that any deficiency in one year shall 
be made up out of the gross profits of any succeeding year or years. 
5. The said Terry R. West shall be the manager of the partner-
ship business and shall be entitled to draw up to but not exceeding 
the sum of $500.00 per month for his services, all amounts so 
drawn to be charged as a partnership expense and deducted before 
any division of net profits is made. 
6. The net profits of the business shall be divided between the 
partners in the following proportions: Rulon R. West, forty per cent 
( 40%) ; Terry R. West, forty per cent ( 40%) and Flora E. West 
twenty per cent ( 20% ) ; and the partners shall in like proportion 
bear all losses, including loss of capital. 
7. The usual books of account shall be kept properly posted 
up, and shall not be removed from the place of business without 
the consent of all partners. Each partner shall have free access to 
them at ail times, and shall be at liberty to make such extracts 
therefrom as he may think fit. 
v 
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8. On the .15th day of Oc:tober, A.D. _1958 and on the 15th 
day of Octob~r In each succeeding year dunng the continuation of 
the p~rt?7~ship, an ac~ount s~all be taken of all the capital, assets 
and habllitles ~or the time being of the partnership, and a balance 
s~e~t and profit and l~ss account making due allowance for dept-e-
Ciatlon and for recouping any lost capital shall be prepared and a 
copy theerof furnished to each partner. t any time agreed upon by 
all of the partners, after the preparation of the said balance sheet 
and profit and los~ ~ccou?t, the net pr<:>fits, if any, shown by such 
account may be divided In the proportions set forth in paragraph 
6 above hereof. 
9. The partners agree: (a) That Terry R. West shall dili-
gently attend to the business and devote such portion of his time 
the:eto as is necessary to properly and economically operate said 
busu1:ess. (b ~ each partner shall punctually pay his separate debts 
and Indemnify the other partners and the asset of the partnership 
against the same and all expenses on account thereof; (c) each 
partner shall forthwith pay all moneys, checks, and negotiable in-
struments received by him on account of the firm into the bank 
or banks selected by the partners to the firm account; (d) each 
partner shall be just and faithful to the other partners, and at all 
times give to such other partners full information and truthful 
explanations of all matters relating to the affairs of the partnership, 
and afford every assistance in his power in carrying on the business 
for their mutual advantage. 
10. No partner shall without the consent of the others (a) 
Lend any of the moneys or deliver upon credit any of the goods of 
the firm to any person or persons whom the other partners shall 
have previously in writing forbidden him to trust; (b) Give any 
security or promise for the payment of money on account of the 
firm unless in the ordinary course of business; (c) enter into any 
bond, or become bail, indorser or surety for any person, or know-
ingly cause or suffer to be done anything whereby the partnership 
property may be seized, attached, or taken on execution or en-
dangered; (d) assign, mortgage, or charge hi share in the assets or 
profits of teh partnership, or any part of such shae; (e) draw, 
accept, or indorse any bill of exchange or promissory note on 
account of the firm; (f) sign any check on behalf of the firm for 
a sum exceeding $500.00; (g) buy, order, or contract for any goods 
or property exceeding the value of $500.00 on behalf of the part-
nership; (h) compromise, or compound, or, except upon 'Payment 
in full, release or discharge any debt due to the partnership. 
11. If any partner shall die during the continuance of the said 
partnership, the survivors or survivor may puchase the _share of the 
deceased partner in the capital and assets of the business on the 
following terms: (a) The purchase price shall be the atr_lount at 
which such share shall stand in the last balance sheet which shall 
have been prepared prior to the death of said partner plus ten ~r 
cent ( 10%) thereof; (b) such purchase of any deceased partners 
interest, if made by the surviving partners or partner, shall be 
vi 
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effected within one year from the date of death, and in addition 
to the purchase money, the surviving partners or partner shall pay 
a sum equal to interest on the amount of said purchase price com-
puted from the date of the then last preceding annual account up 
to the date of death of the deceased at the rate of 5% per annum 
in lieu both of interest on capital, including any arrears of such 
interest for preceeding years, and profits during such period, credit 
being given for any sums drawn out by the deceased partner during 
the then current year. 
12. If the surviving partners or partner shall not exercise the 
option of purchasing the share and interest of the deceased partner, 
or if the partnership shall be determined or expire during the joint 
lives of the partners, then the partnership shall be wound up, and 
the assets distributed in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6 
above hereof. 
13. All rents, taxes, cost of repairs, alterations, or improve-
ments, insurance and all other costs, charges and expenses which 
shall be incurred in or about the business or in any wise relating 
thereto, and all losses which shall happen in respect to the business, 
shall be paid out of the income or capital of the partnership, and 
in case of any deficiency thereof by the partners in the proportions 
set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof. 
14. Notwithstanding the death of any partner, the partner-
ship between the surviving partners shall continue under these 
articles of partnership. 
15. At the end or sooner determination of the partnership 
the partners, each to the other, shall make a true, just and final 
account of all things relating to their said business, and in all things 
ad just the same; and all stock, as well as the gains and increases 
thereof, including all real and peronal property, which shall 
appear to be remaining, either in money, goods, wares, fixtures, 
debts or otherwise shall be divided between them in the propor-
tions set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof. 
16. Any decisions and major arrangements required or neces-
sary in the operation of said business which are not in the ordinary 
course of operations shall only be made and effected by and with 
the unanimous agreement and consent of all the partners. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partners above named have 
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above 
written. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
/s/ Rulon R. West 
/s/ Terry R. West 
/s/ Flora West 
~ ss 
On the 1st day of October, A.D. 195 7 personally appeared 
before me the said Rulon R. West, Terry R. West and Flora E. 
West, signers of the above instrument, who duly severally acknowl-
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edged to me that they executed the same. 
(Seal) 
My Commission Expires: 
Sept. 10, 1959 
Paul S. Roberts 
. . Notary Public 
Residing at Murray City, Utah 
APPENDIX "B" 
AGREEMENT made this ........ day of................................ 1960 
by and between RULON R. WEST, FLORA E. WEST and 
TERRY R. WEST. ' 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are partners under those cer-
tain Articles of Partnership dated the 15th day of October 1957 
d ' ' an 
WHEREAS, said partnership has been and is hereby declared 
to be dissolved, and 
. WHEREAS, the. parties hereto d~s~re to make an agreement 
with respect to certain matters pertaining to the winding up of 
the partnership affairs, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the part~es hereto agree that Rulon 
R. West and Terry R. West shall have authority to wind up the 
partnership affairs, shall concur in all matters pertaining to the 
winding up of the partnership affairs, and shall proceed to wind 
up_ the partnership affairs in accordance with the following pro-
VISions: 
1. Elements and Completion of Winding Up. The winding up 
of the partnership affairs shall consist of selling all real and per-
sonal property of the partnership, paying all partnership liabilities 
(including liabilities to partners), and distributing the net assets of 
the partnership in cash to the parties hereto in the following 
proportions: 
Rulon R. West 40% 
Terry R. West 40% 
Flora E. West 20% 
When all the net assets of the partnership have been distributed 
in cash in accordance with the preceding sentence, the winding up 
of the partnership affairs shall be completed. 
2. Operation of Partnership Business Pending Sale. Each 
business of the partnership shall be operated until such time as 
such business is sold. Rulon R. Wet and Terry R. West and Flora 
West shall concur in all management decisions pertaining to the 
operation of said businesses. Terry R. West shall diligently att~nd 
to the business in the daily operation of the businesses, wh~ch 
operation shall include the renting of ~cco~odation~, th~ main-
tenance of all partnership property, Including the Inte:Ior and 
exterior of all buildings, rental units, signs, fences, sidewal~, 
driveways and other real and personal property of the partnersh!p, 
in gooo depair, working order and appearan~e, a~d th~ main-
tenance of the motel and trailer camp premises, Including _the 
lawn, shrubbery and trees, in a state of good, neat and attracitve 
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apperance, having such assitance as is reasonably necessary to 
accomplish same. Terry R. West shall receive reasonable and 
periodic compensati~n for his. services per~ining to the daily 
operation of the businesses, whtch compensation shall be on the 
same basis as heretofore taken and no additional compensation 
unless said compensation is agreed upon from [time] to time by 
all of the parties hereto. 
3. Receipts and Disbursements. All receipts obtained from 
operations of the motel, trailer sales, and trailer park shall be 
deposited in the usual account and checked out only for payment 
of employees salaries, utiilties, and ordinary expenses, including 
expenses to Terry R. West as above specified. All receipts involv-
ing sales of capital assets or realization from trailer sales where 
equities aside from the obligation and any other capital assets 
sales shall be placed in a special bank account, from which no 
proceeds can be taken except over the signatures of Terry R. West 
and Rulon R. West, or instead of Rulon R. West, Leroy E. 
Holmes. 
4. Sale of Partnership Property. All partnership property, 
including the good will, shall be sold as soon and for a price as 
near to the fair market value thereof as is reasonably possible 
under the circumstances. Any offer for the purchase of any part 
or all of the partnership property which is made by a reasonbly 
dependable and solvent offeror, on reasonable terms and for a 
reasonable amount shall be accepted. No property shall be ac-
cepted in trade as either part or full payment for the purchase 
of part or all of the partnership propety unless such property can 
be expected to be sold with reasonable promptness at a price equal 
or in excess of the value for which it-- was accepted in trade. 
The sale of the partnership property shall be advertised in a 
reasonable manner, consistent with the desires to make a sale with 
reasonable promptness and to attract the attention of as many as 
possible of those persons who would and could qualify as pur-
chasers. 
5. Distribution of Partnership Assets. The parties hereto shall 
determine from time to time during the period of the winding up 
of the partnership affairs the amount of the partnership assets 
which may be distributed to the perties hereto in cash in the 
~roportions specified in Paragraph 1 hereof, taking into considera-
tion the absolute and contingent liabilities of the partnership. 
6. Statements. On or before the 3rd day of April, 1960, and 
each six (6) months thereafter until the winding up of the 
partnersihp affairs is completed, Terry R. West shall prepare and 
shall distribute to each of the parties hereto an accurate, detailed 
and complete statement of all partnership assets, liabilities, re-
ceipts and disbursements. The partnership books hall be kept 
current by Terry R. West. Each of the parties shall have access 
to the partnerhip books at any reasonable time. 
7. Authority of Leroy E. Holmes. At all times during which 
Rulon R. West is away from Salt Lake City, Utah, during the 
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period of the winding up of t~e partnership affairs, Leroy E. 
Holmes, of 1381 Brookshire Dnve, Salt Lake City Utah shall 
so long as he is in possession of a written and effedtive po'wer of 
attorney from Rulon R. West, have the right to act for and in 
behalf of Rulon R. yYest i~ all matters pertaining to the winding 
up of .t~e partne~ship affaus, and shall have the rights, powers 
and pnvtleges which Rulon R. West has under this agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto 
subscribed their names the day and year above written. 
/s/ Rulon R. West 
/s/ Flora West 
/s/ Terry R. West 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
On the 31st day of March, 1960, personally appeared before 
me RULON R. WEST, one of the signers of the within and 
foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
My commission expires: 
April 9, 1961 
Jane Roberts 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
APPENDIX "C'' 
AGREEMENT 
This supplemental agreement to the dissolution agreement 
made and entered into the 2nd day of April, 1960, wherein it 
is mutually agreed as follows: 
1. The contribution made by Rulon R. West with respect 
to the 40 per cent interest acquired by Terry R. West was and 
is a gift from Rulon R. West to Terry R. West, and Rulon R. 
West does agree to file a gift tax return in connection therewith 
so stating. 
2. Should the motel or the businesses be sold at a loss 
wherein the net recoveries are less than the sums due thereon, 
all loss will be absorbed and paid by Rulon R. West. 
3. The undersigned, Rulon R. West, further certifies. that 
the interest in the El Rancho Enterprises was not only a gift to 
Terry R. West, but also to Flora West and their interests were 
acquired by virtue of the gift. . 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of April, 1960. 
/s/ Rulon R. West 
/s/ Terry R. West 
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